Avoid These Election Outcome Pitfalls

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Avoid These Election Outcome Pitfalls

Table of Contents:

  1. Introduction
  2. Background
  3. The Swiss Electronic Internet Voting System
  4. Challenges Faced by the Swiss Voting System 4.1 Errors in the Verification Protocol 4.2 Flaws in the Shuffle Proof 4.3 Issues with the Decryption Proof
  5. Implications of the Errors 5.1 Compromised Verifiability 5.2 Undetectable Exploits
  6. Comparison of Switzerland and New South Wales 6.1 Regulations and Transparency Rules 6.2 Testing and Review processes
  7. Lessons Learned
  8. Conclusion

The Swiss Electronic Internet Voting System: A Story of Flaws and Compromised Verifiability

Introduction

In today's fast-paced digital world, technological advancements have touched various aspects of our lives, including the way we vote. Internet voting systems have been developed to provide convenience and accessibility to voters. However, ensuring the integrity and security of these systems is of utmost importance. This article delves into the Swiss electronic internet voting system, one of the oldest internet voting projects in the world. It explores the discoveries made when the source code became available and sheds light on the errors in the verification protocol, shuffle proof, and decryption proof. Additionally, it compares the circumstances in Switzerland with those in New South Wales, highlighting the role of regulations and transparency rules. Finally, it presents the lessons learned from this story of flaws and compromised verifiability.

Background

The Swiss electronic internet voting system was designed to provide complete verifiability, allowing voters to cast their votes online securely. Each voter received a code sheet with unique codes corresponding to their choices in the election. The encrypted votes were then sent to a central server known as the control component. The control components, along with mixed servers, shuffled and partially decrypted the votes. However, the system relied on certain assumptions and protocols that were later found to be flawed.

The Swiss Electronic Internet Voting System

  1. Challenges Faced by the Swiss Voting System

4.1 Errors in the Verification Protocol

During the open evaluation process, errors were discovered in the verification protocol used in the Swiss voting system. These errors affected the soundness of the commitment scheme, specifically the Peterson commitments. The commitment scheme did not generate the trapdoor commitment properly, compromising the security of the system. This oversight allowed for the manipulation of the permutation matrix and led to incorrect verifiability of the shuffling process.

4.2 Flaws in the Shuffle Proof

The shuffle proof in the Swiss voting system relied on the correct shuffling of votes. However, the Bayer and Grouse algorithm used for shuffling was implemented incorrectly. The commitment scheme failed to generate the commitment according to the appropriate standards. As a result, a malicious attacker could modify the ciphertext through colluding with a cheating client, providing a false proof that the shuffling has been done correctly.

4.3 Issues with the Decryption Proof

The decryption proof in the Swiss voting system used a non-interactive zero-knowledge protocol to prove the equality of discrete logs. However, a heuristic known as the Fetch-a-Mere heuristic was applied to make the proof non-interactive. This heuristic allowed the prover to generate their challenge, leading to vulnerabilities. The failure to hash the first element of the ciphertext, C_naught, made it possible for a malicious prover to cheat the verification process.

  1. Implications of the Errors

5.1 Compromised Verifiability

The errors in both the shuffle and decryption proofs compromised the verifiability of the Swiss voting system. The cheating proof transcripts became indistinguishable from valid proof transcripts, making it impossible to detect any manipulation or alteration of the election outcome. The trustworthiness of the system was shattered, raising concerns about the overall integrity of the voting process.

5.2 Undetectable Exploits

The exploitable nature of the errors allowed for undetectable manipulation of the election outcome. The colluding mixing and decryption components could alter the votes, providing false proofs for the correctness of the process. This meant that a single component had the power to invalidate a valid vote or insert a fabricated vote, undermining the entire election process.

  1. Comparison of Switzerland and New South Wales

6.1 Regulations and Transparency Rules

Switzerland had detailed verification requirements and strong transparency rules in place for their internet voting system. The availability of their source code for public review played a crucial role in identifying the flaws in the system. On the other HAND, New South Wales lacked similar regulations, making it difficult to have an independent review of their system. The non-disclosure of the source code hindered the detection of errors until after the election took place.

6.2 Testing and Review Processes

Switzerland's open evaluation process allowed for thorough testing and identification of vulnerabilities. The discoveries made in the code prompted a reevaluation and a deeper understanding of the system's flaws. In contrast, New South Wales relied on the confidence of the Electoral Commission without adequate scrutiny or independent analysis. The lack of a comprehensive and rigorous review process exposed the system to potential vulnerabilities.

  1. Lessons Learned

The story of the Swiss electronic internet voting system highlights several important lessons. Firstly, even secure protocols can be compromised if their underlying assumptions are not met. It is crucial to thoroughly evaluate and test the system to ensure the integrity and security of the voting process. Secondly, regulations and transparency rules play a vital role in fostering trust and accountability. Open public access to the source code enables independent review and helps detect potential flaws or vulnerabilities.

  1. Conclusion

The Swiss electronic internet voting system serves as a reminder of the importance of robust verification protocols and transparency in the electoral process. The errors identified in the system emphasize the need for thorough testing, independent review, and adherence to established standards. By learning from these mistakes and implementing stringent measures, we can build trust and confidence in internet voting systems, ensuring the accuracy and integrity of election outcomes.

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