Exploring Derrida's Critique of Husserl's Phenomenology

Table of Contents:

1. Introduction
2. The Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP)
3. Derrida and Husserl: An Overview
4. Derrida's Affirmation of Husserlian Inter-Subjectivity
   1. The Marginal Position of Derrida in Phenomenology
   2. Derrida's Deconstruction of Phenomenology
   3. Derrida's Affirmation of Husserl's Theory of Inter-Subjectivity
5. Exploring Derrida's Defense of Husserlian Analogical Appresentation
   1. The Notion of Analogical Appresentation
   2. The Irreducibility of Otherness in Analogical Appresentation
   3. Derrida's Critique of Levinasian Model of Alterity
   4. Derrida's Defense of Husserlian Alter Ego
   5. Analogical Appresentation as a Coherent Account of Alterity
6. The Preservation of the First-Person Perspective in Derrida's Thought
   1. Derrida's Critique of Phenomenological Ego
   2. Duality Within the First-Person Perspective
   3. The Role of Analogical Representation in Bearing Witness
   4. The Internally Contaminated First-Person Perspective
7. Conclusion
8. References

Article:

Derrida and Husserl: Exploring the Coherence of Analogical Appresentation in Phenomenology

Introduction

Phenomenology, as a branch of philosophy, has had a profound impact on our understanding of Perception and consciousness. Within the phenomenological tradition, two prominent figures are Jacques Derrida and Edmund Husserl. While both philosophers have made significant contributions to the field, Derrida's relationship with phenomenology has often been seen as controversial. In this article, we will explore the coherence of analogical appresentation, a key concept in Husserl's theory of inter-subjectivity, as defended by Derrida. We will analyze Derrida's affirmation of Husserlian perspectives, his criticism of other models of alterity, and the preservation of the first-person perspective within his thought.

The Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP)

The Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) is one of the most influential philosophy conferences in the United States. It provides a platform for scholars and researchers within the field of phenomenology to engage with each other's work. Derrida has been an active participant in this conference, using it as an opportunity to present his ideas on phenomenology and existential philosophy. His presentations have attracted Attention due to his unique perspective and critical analysis of traditional phenomenological concepts.

Derrida and Husserl: An Overview

Derrida's engagement with phenomenology can be traced back to his early studies of Husserl's work. Initially, Derrida was a promising scholar of Husserl, but he went on to deconstruct fundamental aspects of the phenomenological project throughout his career. Despite this deconstructive approach, Derrida's fascination with Husserl's theory of inter-subjectivity remained constant. He argues that Husserl's notion of analogical appresentation offers a more persuasive account of alterity than those offered by other philosophers. In this article, we will explore Derrida's defense of analogical appresentation and its implications for our understanding of otherness.

Derrida's Affirmation of Husserlian Inter-Subjectivity

Derrida finds himself occupying a marginal position within phenomenology due to his deconstructive tendencies. However, he repeatedly affirms Husserl's theory of analogical appresentation as unparalleled in its respect for the otherness of other beings. Derrida argues that the notion of analogical appresentation, as developed by Husserl, provides a more coherent account of alterity than the currently dominant Levinasian model. By delving into various writings of Derrida, we will analyze his defense of Husserl's theory and its implications for our understanding of inter-subjectivity.

Exploring Derrida's Defense of Husserlian Analogical Appresentation

Derrida's defense of analogical appresentation goes beyond a mere affirmation of Husserl's theory; it delves into the very nature of inter-subjectivity and the encounter with the other. He argues that analogical appresentation, which acknowledges the irreducible lack of direct access to the other, offers a more robust account of alterity. We will analyze Derrida's critique of Levinasian models and his assertion that only through analogical appresentation can we truly respect the otherness of other beings. This exploration will shed light on the fundamental role of analogical appresentation in understanding inter-subjectivity.

The Preservation of the First-Person Perspective in Derrida's Thought

Derrida's deconstructive tendencies have often been associated with a rejection of the first-person perspective and phenomenological ego. However, closer examination reveals that Derrida preserves the first-person perspective, albeit in a deconstructed form. He argues that the first-person perspective is necessary for any experience, including the confrontation with the other. Through analogical representation, Derrida contends that we can bridge the gap between self and other while acknowledging the internal contamination of the first-person perspective by otherness. This section will explore how Derrida's understanding of the first-person perspective enhances our comprehension of inter-subjectivity.

Conclusion

In this article, we have delved into the complex relationship between Derrida and Husserl within the realm of phenomenology. Derrida's defense of Husserl's theory of analogical appresentation challenges dominant models of alterity and offers a more coherent account of inter-subjectivity. Furthermore, we have highlighted how Derrida's deconstructive approach does not eliminate the first-person perspective but rather reveals its internal complexities and contamination by otherness. By exploring these ideas, we hope to encourage further discussion and investigation into the intricacies of phenomenology and its relevance in understanding the human experience.

References

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